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RICHARD NOBLES* and DAVID SCHIFF**
THE SUPERVISION OF GUILTY PLEAS BY THE COURT
OF APPEAL OF ENGLAND AND WALES – WORKABLE
RELATIONSHIPS AND TRAGIC CHOICES
ABSTRACT. The judgments of criminal appeal courts are an example of Calabresi
and Bobbitt’s concept of tragic choice’. Judges justify convictions by reference to the
values which they attribute to criminal procedures: fairness, truth and rights, rather
than the full range of considerations which have influenced the introduction of those
procedures: cost, efficiency, crime control, public perceptions of crime, etc. The
difficulties facing the Court of Appeal in justifying convictions by juries after a full
trial are multiplied in the case of convictions following guilty pleas. A procedure
which on its face is less capable of identifying guilt than a trial, has to be defended on
the basis that it is overwhelmingly more capable of identifying guilt (or so fair as to
justify disregarding the possibility of innocence). Recent changes to the plea system
restricting maximum sentence discounts to pleas made at the earliest opportunity
further distance guilty pleas from the protections afforded by trial, and compound
the difficulties in justifying these convictions as safe’. With guilty pleas we have
reached a situation where the Court of Appeal seems unable to provide a remedy for
miscarriages, but instead, like the judges of the 19th century opposing the creation of
the Criminal Court of Appeal, claims the procedure is so safe that there is little or no
need for review, even in cases of procedural irregularity (short of abuse of process) or
new evidence (short of exoneration).
I INTRODUCTION
I think that the Complaints of the present Mode of administering the Criminal
Law have little Foundation, for the Cases in which the Innocent are improp-
erly convicted are extremely rare; some, no doubt, there are; and I consider it
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impossible in any human System in administering Justice to avoid such Mis-
fortunes occasionally. (Baron Parke’s evidence in 1848 to a Select Committee
of the House of Lords on a Criminal Law Administration Amendment Bill).1
Is Baron Parke’s sanguinity about the improbability of miscarriages
of justice in the 19th century merely a matter of historical interest, or
does it find echoes in judicial attitudes towards the safety of con-
victions today? And if such echoes exist, does this point to the
presence, in our criminal justice system, of factors that transcend
historical change? In this article we explore the theme of judicial
reluctance towards undoing convictions in the context of the ever-
increasing reliance on guilty pleas as a mechanism by which those
convictions are achieved.
II OVERVIEW
Our exploration proceeds through four stages. In Part One we draw
on arguments, previously made by us and mirrored in the writings of
many others, as to the reasons why appeal court judges necessarily
show deference to the trial court practices which they formally
supervise, and the difficulties which this creates for them when it
comes to identifying miscarriages of justice. In the second part, we
describe the English criminal justice system’s current dependence on
convictions obtained through guilty pleas, and the constraints placed
on the possibilities to appeal those convictions. In the third part, we
consider the justifications given for these restricted rights of appeal
and demonstrate that they lack both plausibility and coherence. They
are, we will claim, modern examples of what, from an external per-
spective appear as a wilful refusal to embrace the real chances for
miscarriages of justice to arise from flawed criminal justice proce-
dures. In the last section, we discuss the prospects for changes which
might alleviate the need for our senior judiciary to continue to deny
the obvious risk of wrongful (both in the sense of unfair and factually
incorrect) convictions when considering appeals from convictions
obtained following guilty pleas.
1 Quoted in A.H. Manchester, Sources of English Legal History: Law, History, and
Society in England and Wales 1750–1950 (London: Butterworths, 1984), 179. Baron
Parke (later Lord Wensleydale) was a senior judge sitting as a Law Lord until his
death in 1868. Opposition by senior judicial figures was significant in preventing the
setting up of a Criminal Court of Appeal during the 19th century in which some 31
Bills trying to do so failed, before one eventually succeeded in 1907.
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III PART ONE: THE NEED FOR APPEAL COURTS TO
EXHIBIT DEFERENCE TOWARDS THE
PROCEDURES WHICH THEY SUPERVISE
The reluctance of the English judiciary to re-examine convictions
arising from trial by jury has a long history, dating back to well
before the passing of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 and the creation
of the Criminal Court of Appeal, the first court to be given this
specific authority.2 Whilst there are many factors which have led and
may well continue to lead to this reluctance, whether directed towards
jury trial or other means by which convictions are achieved, one of
the central reasons is common to any system of appeals – the need for
a workable relationship between institutions making decisions at first
instance, and the bodies that have authority for correcting their er-
rors.3 In the context of criminal appeals, the Court of Appeal has to
be able to identify errors within the criminal justice system, without
undermining the ability of first instance criminal courts to administer
the number of cases that are being steered towards them through
arrests, charges and other pre-trial procedures. As part of this task, it
needs to avoid overwhelming itself by generating more appeals than
it, or other courts acting in their capacity as appeal courts, can hope
to process or can only process with an ever-increasing backlog of
undecided cases.
A workable relationship between the appeal and trial courts has
implications for what the appeal courts can identify as errors. For
example, if an appeal court treats every case where it would reach a
different verdict on the evidence as an error, then there does not need
to be anything wrong with trial procedures for an appeal to be
2 See R. Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844–1994 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996) especially ch 1 The Making of the Court of Criminal Appeal’
and ch 2 The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division: An Overview’; R. Nobles and D.
Schiff Understanding Miscarriages of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
ch 3 Remedying miscarriages of justice: the history of the Court of Criminal Ap-
peal’, esp 41–55.
3 As background to some of wide-ranging issues involved, see: M. Shapiro, Ap-
peal’ (1980) Law & Society Review 629; R. Nobles and D. Schiff, The Right to
Appeal and Workable Systems of Justice’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 676; R.
Nobles and D. Schiff, The Criminal Cases Review Commission: establishing a
workable relationship with the Court of Appeal’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 173; R.
Pattenden, The standards of review for mistake of fact in the Court of Appeal,
(Criminal Division)’ [2009] Criminal Law Review 16; M. Elliott and R. Thomas,
Tribunal Justice and Proportionate Dispute Resolution’ [2012] Cambridge Law
Journal 297.
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possible: all verdicts are open to a de novo consideration. Since its
creation, the Criminal Court of Appeal (now Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division)) has strongly resisted such a role,4 limiting itself
to the review of procedures pre-trial and trial, and adamantly (subject
to its interpretation of a few so-called lurking doubt’5 or otherwise
exceptional cases) only reappraising verdicts where it finds procedural
errors or compelling new evidence. This resistance has been the
subject of strong criticism, with the Court of Appeal regularly,
throughout its history, accused of showing undue deference’ to the
verdicts of juries.6 There is a substantial academic literature dealing
with this aspect of the Court’s performance, and with the work of the
Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC’), the body introduced
to redress a variety of perceived failures, including that of the Court
of Appeal as a mechanism for the rectification of miscarriages of
justice.7 But despite whatever may constitute undue’ deference, there
is an inescapable need for the Court of Appeal to show some level of
deference towards the bodies and procedures which it supervises.
As the body (together with other bodies sitting as lower appeal
courts) which decides on which convictions should be quashed, the
Court of Appeal also has responsibility for deciding on the converse –
which convictions should stand. This unavoidably involves an exer-
cise in justification. Every rejected appeal or application for leave to
4 Stated clearly by Lord Tucker in the Privy Council case of Aladesuru v R [1956]
AC 49, at 54–5. … it has long been established that the appeal is not by way of
rehearing as in civil cases on appeals from a judge sitting alone, but is a limited
appeal which precludes the court from reviewing the evidence and making its own
valuation thereof.’
5 See L.H. Leigh, Lurking doubt and the safety of convictions’ [2006] Criminal
Law Review 809; and succinctly, R. Grist, Lurking doubts remain’ Criminal Law &
Justice Weekly 2012, 176(22) 313–14. Success will only occur in exceptional’ cases’,
see R v Pope (John Randall) [2012] EWCA Crim 2241.
6 See, for a clear example, The Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice,
Cm 2263 (London, HMSO, 1993) ch 10, para 3; also S. Roberts, Fresh evidence and
factual innocence in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal’ [2017] Journal of
Criminal Law 303, esp 304–5, and n 8.
7 M. Zander, The Criminal Cases Review Commission, the Court of Appeal and
jury decisions – a better way forward’, Criminal Law & Justice Weekly 2015, 179(4),
179(12), 179(7); M. Zander, The Justice Select Committee’s report on the CCRC –
where do we go from here?’ [2015] Criminal Law Review 473; H Quirk, Identifying
Miscarriages of Justice: Why Innocence in the UK Is Not the Answer’ (2007) 70
Modern Law Review 759; S. Roberts and L. Weathered. Assisting the Factually
Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the
Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2009) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43.
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appeal is a decision involving the claim that the procedures that led to
the conviction were good’ or at least good enough’. So, for example,
whilst there are any number of ways in which a trial before a jury may
go wrong, it is not open to the Court of Appeal to express doubts on
the ability of jury trial, as an institution, to reach correct conclusions
as to the guilt of those that they convict. The good enough’ quality of
the jury as a fact-finding body is not an opinion reached on the basis
of social scientific evidence,8 it is something reiterated, within the
criminal justice system, explicitly or implicitly, with each rejected
appeal against a jury verdict. Not only must the Court acknowledge
the general suitability of juries as fact-finding bodies, it must also
resist grounds of appeal which would undermine the ability of juries
to execute their fact-finding function. So, for example, normally’
allowing appeals on the basis of evidence not used, or arguments not
made, would seriously weaken the ability of juries to determine guilt,
as every trial involves some unused evidence and some discarded
arguments.9
The statutory powers allocated to the Court of Appeal give the
Court an almost unlimited power to declare any conviction unsafe.10
This formally unlimited supervisory power has to be seen in the
context of a system whose features lie largely outside of the Court’s
control. It does not, for example, establish the levels of legal aid, or
the funding available to the police or the Crown Prosecution Service
(CPS’) for the investigation and prosecution of crime, or even the
8 This is not to deny that such evidence is available. Cheryl Thomas’ analysis of
jury verdicts, for example, offers reassuring evidence that they are not biased against
black defendants, that they convict at a higher rate where offences involve the most
direct evidence of guilt, and at lower rates when the offence requires a judgement on
the intentions which accompany the relevant acts; but that less than a majority of
juries fully understand the judges’ legal directions: see her Ethnicity and the Fairness
of Jury Trials in England and Wales 2006–2014’ [2017] Criminal Law Review 860;
and Are Juries Fair?’ (UK Ministry of Justice Research Series, 01/10, 2010). Whilst
this evidence is indeed generally reassuring, it is not the source for judicial deference
to jury verdicts.
9 For a brief discussion of this issue, in the context of expert evidence, see W.E.
O’Brian, Fresh Expert Evidence in CCRC Cases’ (2011) 22 King’s Law Journal 1, esp
3–7.
10 The relevant legislation is the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, section 2, as amended
by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, section 2, which legislation does not define what
constitutes unsafe’, except negatively. For example, the Court may not consider an
appeal based on the claim that a defendant should have been entitled to elect for
summary trial but was denied this right due to an erroneous over-valuing of the
property involved: 1968 Act, s. 1(3).
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budgets allocated to itself or the courts which it supervises. And
whilst much criminal procedure is within judicial control, being either
a creature of the common law, or rules announced by the Court itself,
or by bodies staffed by judges,11 substantial elements are the result of
statute and policy priorities, over which judges have limited influ-
ence.12 The criminal justice system is constructed in response to
considerations of cost and efficiency, as well as more obvious political
agendas such as social control, and many other indeterminable fac-
tors, such as the perceived need to respond to fears of crime expressed
within the mass media.13 But, when attempting to justify convictions
as safe’ it is not open to the Court of Appeal to draw on these kinds
of consideration in deciding that particular defendants, who may be
innocent of the crimes of which they are charged, should nevertheless
continue to be punished. The Court operates through a discourse
which assumes that convictions obtained in accordance with defen-
dants’ rights will ordinarily establish safe’ convictions in nearly all
cases, limiting itself to quashing convictions obtained where there has
been a breach of those rights, or where new evidence has emerged
that was not available at the trial, and only exceptionally in other
lurking doubt’ cases. The need to assume that the criminal justice
process ordinarily produces safe convictions means that the Court of
Appeal’s supervisory role involves a strong element of deference. In
11 For example, judges make up eight of the fourteen members of the Sentencing
Council: https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/about-us/council-members/.The
Criminal ProcedureRule Committee consists of the Lord Chief Justice of England and
Wales and 17 people appointed by the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor
under section 70 of the Courts Act 2003 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisa
tions/criminal-procedure-rule-committee/about#membership.
12 For an example of judges struggling with statutory procedural requirements
which clash with their concepts of a fair trial, see R v B [2003] EWCA Crim 319 at
paras 26 and 27 – historic sex abuse conviction based on the complainant’s uncor-
roborated testimony, following statutory removal of the requirement for corrobo-
ration – overturned on the basis of a residual discretion to set aside a conviction if
we feel it is unsafe or unfair to allow it to stand. .. even where the trial process itself
cannot be faulted.’
13 See R. Reiner, S. Livingstone and J. Allen, From law and order to lynch mobs:
crime news since the Second World War, in P. Mason (ed.), Criminal Visions: Media
Representations of Crime and Justice (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003), ch 1. High
profile crimes signal’ the problems within society that require reaction, see M. Innes,
‘‘Signal crimes’’, detective work, mass media and constructing collective memory’,
also in P. Mason (ed.) ch 3. For a classic study of criminal justice responding to
media created perceptions of crisis, see S. Hall et al, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the
State, and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978).
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previous publications we have described the Court of Appeal’s need
to justify a system of trial constructed by reference to factors outside
its control and for reasons that it cannot articulate, as an example of
tragic choice.14 Choices are tragic here arising from the difficulties of
upholding values associated with justice – the ability of the criminal
process to establish the fact of defendants’ guilt through fair proce-
dures – in the face of institutions whose design is heavily influenced
by other values such as cost and efficiency.
IV PART TWO: THE GUILTY PLEA REGIME
AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE ABILITY
TO APPEAL
The need for deference, and the difficulties of justifying it, are
heightened when one refocuses to consider the relationship between
the Court of Appeal and convictions achieved through guilty pleas.
At present, around 91% of the convictions obtained by the CPS are
the result of guilty pleas. The figure for convictions obtained via plea
in the Crown Court alone is 88.38%.15 Thus, we have a large
dependence on guilty pleas comparable to that in the USA, a level
which led their Supreme Court to observe that pleas, not trials is the
14 We have, in particular, analysed the responsibility and role of the Court of
Appeal by drawing on G. Calabresi and P. Bobbitt’s concept of tragic choice in their
book Tragic Choices (New York: W.W.Norton, 1978). Tragic choice describes the
situation when chosen first order institutional arrangements have to be defended at a
secondary level without acknowledging the inherent sacrifice of values in those
earlier choices. See R. Nobles and D. Schiff, The Never-Ending Story: Disguising
Tragic Choices in Criminal Justice’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 293.
15 In their 2018–19 annual report the CPS record convictions in 83.7% of their
cases, with convictions obtained via guilty plea in 76.7% of cases. Guilty pleas were
therefore 91.64% of total convictions. See Crown Prosecution Service Annual Report
and Accounts 2018–9, HC 2286, p. 7. A breakdown of convictions obtained in the
Magistrates’ and the Crown Courts over the three financial years 2016–7, 2017–8,
and 2018–9 is provided at pages 22 and 25. Ignoring convictions obtained in absence
(mostly minor traffic offences dealt with in the absence of the defendant) the per-
centage of convictions obtained through guilty pleas over these three years in each
court were: Magistrates’ Courts: 93.21%, 92.7%, 93.56%; Crown Courts: 88.79%,
88.68%, 88.38%.
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criminal justice system’.16 As in the United States, defendants are
offered inducements to plead guilty, in the form of lower sen-
tences than would occur if they were convicted at trial. These
reductions occur in three ways: through an automatic reduction
of up to a third off the sentence that would be the appropriate
starting point if conviction had followed trial; through the pros-
ecution accepting a guilty plea to a lesser charge and not pur-
suing the more serious charge or charges;17 by the prosecution
agreeing to the conviction being based on a less serious version of
the facts than might otherwise be established at trial.18 Contrary
16 See Lafler v Cooper 566 U.S. Rep. 156 (2012) and Missouri v Frye 566 U.S. 134
(2012) decided on the same day and approving this statement taken from R. Scott
and W. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract’ (1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 1909, at
1912. The Supreme Court made this observation in light of 97% of federal convic-
tions and 94% of state convictions being the result of guilty pleas. The manner in
which our guilty plea system resembles that in the US is not limited to numbers – see
the common features identified by Lord Brown inMcKinnon v US (2008) UKHL 59,
para 34. Even in the US the change from an informal plea-bargaining system to the
formal one of today is of recent origin: see D.J. Newman, Conviction: The Deter-
mination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1966).
17 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 2018 states that the prosecution, when con-
sidering whether to accept a guilty plea, must not do so just because it is convenient’,
and that they must ensure that the court is able to pass a sentence that matches the
seriousness of the offending, especially where there are aggravating features.’ CPS
code of guidance, 2018, paras 9.4 and 9.2. It is difficult to see this as anything more
than a directive not to abandon more serious charges where defendants have no
serious prospect of acquittal. If there is any doubt that the prosecution will succeed,
then it is not simply a matter of convenience’ to accept a lesser charge. The evidence’
test for charging identifies the space’ for prosecutors to accept pleas to lesser
charges. Charging only requires judgement that a conviction is more likely than not’,
whilst a court is required to be sure that the defendant is guilty’. (para 4.7). https://
www.CPS.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors.
18 In the U.S. in 2001 (the last year when the relevant data was collected and pub-
lished) the average length of incarnation for defendants who pleaded guilty in the
Federal courts was 61.6% less than the sentence imposed on those who were convicted
at trial. (See Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, Table 5.3: https://www.bjs.
gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=599.This was despite the fact that the Federal Sen
tencing guidelines recommend on average only a 35%maximum reduction in sentence
for accepting responsibility. (See S. Bibas, Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of
Trial’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 2463, at 2488–9.) Bargaining over facts, and
pleading to charges with lower sentences, may account for the additional 26%. To
know whether fact and charge negotiations allow the CPS to offer a similar level of
discount toUS prosecutors, data would have to be collected on the custodial sentences
imposed on persons convicted by plea and after trial, and the averages compared. To
our knowledge, this data is not available. For our purposes, the important point is that
the English criminal justice system’s dependence on guilty pleas is comparable to theU.
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to former orthodoxy,19 our judiciary can now confirm, on request,
what sentence would be imposed if the defendant pleaded guilty
and, in a break from the adversarial tradition, may even raise the
issue of a guilty plea in open court where it appears clear to
them that a guilty plea should have been considered by the
defendant.20 They may not however inform defendants of the
sentences that they can expect if they continue to plead not guilty
and are convicted at trial.21 The scope and need for circuit judges
to become directly involved in this process has been reduced by
the recent standardisation of reduction of sentence attributable to
the plea itself, and by the introduction of a requirement that the
maximum one third sentence reduction will only occur if defen-
dants plead guilty at their first appearance at the Magistrates’
Court.22 The former reduces the need for individual judges to
form their own views of what reduction might be justified (for
example, giving less reduction where they consider the evidence of
guilt overwhelming);23 the latter requires defendants who wish to
Footnote 18 continued
S., not whether the incentives offered are, on average, higher or lower. When justi-
fying guilty plea convictions on appeal, it is not the average rate of discount which is
relevant, but the actual discount offered in the individual case.
19 R v Turner [1970] 2 Q.B. 321.
20 R v Goodyear [2005] W.L.R. 2532. In Horne’s view: asking if the defendant has
been advised on discounts is a bit like asking someone to agree not to beat their partner.
Since it should have already been done, the doing of it by the judge operates as pressure
on the defendant’. J. Horne A Plea of Convenience: An Examination of the Guilty
Pleas in England &Wales’ PhD thesis, University ofWarwick, 2016, 218, available at:
https://ccrc.gov.uk/research-at-the-ccrc/published-research-on-the-ccrc/. In the Mag
istrates’ Court, defendantswhoplead not guilty can ask for an indication as towhether,
if they changed plea, they would receive a non-custodial sentence. If a positive indica
tion is given, they can change their plea. J. Sprack, A Practical Approach to Criminal
Procedure (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 15th edn, 2015) 113, para 8.16.
21 R v Goodyear, ibid.
22 Sentencing Council, Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea – first hearing on or
after 1 June 2017 para 1. Available at: https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/over
arching-guides/crown-court/item/reduction-in-sentence-for-a-guilty-plea-first-hear
ing-on-or-after-1-june-2017/. See, in particular, the flowcharts illustrating reductions.
23 The guidelines, ibid., in their Key Principles, provide that: The strength of the
evidence should not be taken into account when determining the level of reduction’.
Neither should factors such as admissions at interview, co-operation with the
investigation and demonstrations of remorse.’ A residual discretion to depart from
these guidelines arises only in the exceptional case, where the court is satisfied that it
would be contrary to the interest of justice to do so.’
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obtain maximum reductions of sentence to make their pleas prior
to the case appearing at the Crown Court. Unless defendants
enter a guilty plea at this first appearance the reduction for guilty
plea reduces from a third to a quarter (with further staged
reductions down to one tenth of sentence where the guilty plea is
entered on the first day of trial).
There has been a recent regularisation of the information that
must be disclosed to defendants at this early stage.24 Whilst this has a
number of purposes,25 one of these is to ensure that the CPS can
demonstrate to defendants the strength of the prosecution case.
Without this, the incentive provided by the maximum discount for
pleading guilty would be undermined in failing to demonstrate to
defendants that they face a strong likelihood of being convicted at
trial. The level of disclosure required at this stage depends on whether
defendants are in custody, and whether prosecutors can anticipate a
guilty plea at the first hearing. The lowest level of disclosure applies
to defendants in custody. Here disclosure is limited to a summary of
the circumstances of the offence and defendants’ criminal record.26
24 See Initial Details of the Prosecution Case (Advance Information), set out in
Sentencing Council, ibid.The ability of the CPS to meet this standard has been
facilitated by a standardisation of the material which the police must provide to them
at each stage of the proceedings. See National File Standard May 2015, available at:
https://www.CPS.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/dpp_guidance_
5_annex_c.pdf.The advance information provisions do not apply to offences that are
triable only summarily, but it is the policy of the CPS to provide advance provision
to the defence of all proposed prosecution evidence prior to summary trial – Sprack,
supra note 20, para 8.13.
25 The details must include sufficient information to allow the defendant and the
court at the first hearing to take an informed view: i. on plea; ii. on venue for trial (if
applicable); iii. for the purposes of case management; or iv. for the purposes of
sentencing (including committal for sentence, if applicable).’ Case progression and
trial preparation in the Magistrates’ Courts Criminal Practice Directions – October
2015 (including amendments up to April 2019), para 3A.4. https://www.judiciary.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/crim-pd-amendment-no-8-consolidated-mar2019.pdf.
26 The Criminal Procedure Rules October 2015 as amended April 2017, para
8.3(a). https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/2015/crim
inal-procedure-rules-practice-directions-april-2019.pdf.
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But if the prosecution intends to put any other material before the
court, this must first be disclosed and defendants given time to con-
sider it prior to the decision to plead.27 The next level of advance
disclosure applies to those not in custody, where the prosecution
expects defendants to plead guilty. Here, prior to the first hearing at
the Magistrates’ Court, the CPS are required to provide the court and
defendants28 with: a summary of the circumstances of the case; any
account given by the defendant in interview; any written witness
statement or exhibit that the prosecutor then has available and
considers material to plea or to the allocation of the case for trial or
sentence; a list of the defendants’ criminal record, if any; any avail-
able victim impact statement.29 The highest level of advance disclo-
sure is reserved for defendants not in custody, who are expected to
plead not guilty.30 The additional disclosure required here is not di-
rected at the plea decision (though it may affect this), but is intended
to allow the issues at trial to be identified.31 The additional required
information consists of details of witnesses’ availability, as far as they
are known; an indication of any medical or other expert evidence that
the prosecution is likely to adduce in relation to a victim or the
defendant; any information as to special measures, bad character or
27 Ibid., para 8.4.
28 Ibid., para 8.2(2).
29 Ibid., para 8.3. The examples of anticipated guilty pleas provided in the national
file standard demonstrate an intention to restrict these to open and shut’ cases: the
suspect has made a clear and unambiguous admission to the offence and has said
nothing that could be used as a defence… or the suspect has made no admission but
has not denied the offence or otherwise indicated it will be contested and the com-
mission of the offence and identification of the offender can be established by reliable
evidence or the suspect can be seen clearly committing the offence on a good quality
visual recording.’ https://www.CPS.gov.uk/legal-guidance/charging-directors-gui
dance-2013-fifth-edition-may-2013-revised-arrangements (at para 17).
30 The case is also likely to be allocated to a different kind of hearing and at a later
date: an Early Administrative Hearing instead of a normal Early First Hearing (see
Sprack, supra note 20, para 7.03).
31 It is essential that the initial details of the prosecution case that are provided for
that first hearing are sufficient to assist the court, in order to identify the real issues
and to give appropriate directions for an effective trial.’ Criminal Practice Directions,
supra note 24, para 3A.12.
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hearsay, where applicable.32 Certain kinds of exhibit evidence are
also expressly required by this stage if forming part of the prosecution
case – CCTV and streamlined forensic reports. Note however that
any failure to produce this last level of advance disclosure does not
affect the requirement that the defendant should enter a plea at the
first hearing.33
Underlying this early plea system, and the disclosure requirements
that accompany it, is the assumption that decisions to plead guilty
can be made on the basis of the prosecution case, as it has been
developed up to this point, without any opportunity to develop the
defence case. In particular, defendants have no right to inspect the
material obtained by the police which does not form part of the
prosecutions’ case. The defence has to rely on prosecutors’ duty to
disclose any material which might undermine the prosecution case,34
as the defence have no statutory right to disclosure of unused
material unless and until a not guilty plea is entered. There is a
further assumption that this assessment can be made swiftly, as the
latest date for service of the prosecution case is the morning of the
day of the first hearing.35
The number of cases disposed of via guilty pleas has implications
for workloads, of the Court of Appeal, if such cases are appealed
from the Crown Court, and for Crown Courts when appealed from
Magistrates’ Courts, and if successful appeals would result in an
order for a retrial. One can see how the Court of Appeal avoids this
increased workload through the restrictions which it places on the
grounds of appeal, and especially against convictions based on guilty
pleas. In nearly all such cases, defendants can only appeal on the
basis that their pleas were involuntary or equivocal.36 The need for
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., para 3A.14.
34 R v DPP, ex p. Lee [1999] 2 Cr. App. R. 304.
35 The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, supra note 26, para 8.2(2)(b).
36 [A]n appellant who wishes to challenge a plea must show either that her plea
was involuntary, or equivocal (ie she pleaded guilty without understanding the
nature of the charge or without intending to admit that she was guilty of what was
alleged), or based on fundamentally mistaken advice’. P. Taylor (ed.), Taylor on
Criminal Appeals (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 2012) para 9.03.
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the plea to be unequivocal boils down to a requirement that the plea
represents a confession to facts that constitute the offence charged.37
So, for example, where a defendant pleads guilty on the basis of
alleged facts that do not constitute the offence, an appeal is allowed.38
The requirement of voluntariness adds little to this, as the courts
require only that the decision to plead guilty must be the defendants’
own acts, and not something that can be decided for them by their
legal representatives. A plea is not rendered involuntary because
defendants may have felt coerced by the greater sentence that would
follow if convicted at trial.39 Indeed, if this were sufficient to render a
plea involuntary, then all guilty plea convictions would be appeal-
able. Nor does it make a difference if the pressure arises from an offer
of a lower sentence or of a decision not to prosecute a family member,
should defendants plead guilty.40 This too is considered by the Court
of Appeal to be a normal’ situation.41 The restricted meanings of
what constitutes equivocation and voluntariness limit the legal advice
required for a valid guilty plea. Defendants must understand what
facts they are admitting to, and their intended factual admission must
constitute the offence.42 But there is no need for defendants to have
37 An equivocal plea is one qualified by words which, if true, indicate that the
accused is in fact not guilty of the offence charged.…Such a plea is wholly different
in character—and consequence—from the plea entered here which may have been
reluctant or even wrong headed but was in no sense ambiguous.’ R v Drew (1985) 81
Cr. App. R. 190 at 195.
38 See R v Malik [2018] EWCA Crim 1693, para 13.
39 InMcKinnon, supra note 16, an extradition case, the House of Lords were asked
whether the size of the discount offered by the US authorities for a guilty plea could,
in itself, be an abuse of process. Lord Brown, who gave the sole judgment,
acknowledged that all sentence discounts for guilty pleas create pressure to plead
guilty, but did not regard an offer to inflict a lower sentence than could be awarded
after conviction at trial as either a threat or a bribe sufficient to vitiate the process.
Whilst he acknowledged that some plea offers might constitute abuse, this would not
be solely due to the amount of the discount, but would also depend on the way the
case would be put’ (a factor that allowed him to distinguish the Canadian Supreme
Court decision in USA v Cobb [2001] 1 SCR 587, where the US prosecutor used a TV
interview to draw attention to the likelihood that these defendants, if convicted after
trial rather than through guilty pleas, would be incarcerated in a high security prison
where there would be a high chance that they would suffer homosexual rape.
40 R v Dann [2015] EWCA Crim 390.
41 R v McCarthy [2015] EWCA Crim 1185, para 68.
42 See Malik, supra note 38. The second successful ground of appeal was the
defendant solicitor’s failure to advise him that the admitted facts constituted a de-
fence to the charge.
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an accurate view of the likelihood that they would be convicted if
they opted for trial.43 The restricted need for advice has in turn al-
lowed for the introduction of the requirement that defendants should
plead guilty at the earliest opportunity if they are to enjoy a full (one
third) reduction in sentence in return (see description above).44
The reluctance to allow appeals against guilty plea convictions is
not limited to cases where defendants, without any breach of their
rights, may have succumbed to the pressure to plead guilty arising
from sentence discounts. The restrictions extend even to cases where
defendants have suffered from breaches of their rights, that is cases
which, had the convictions resulted from trials, might have led to
successful appeals. The standard applied to appeals based on pro-
cedural irregularities where defendants have pleaded guilty is closely
linked to the standard for a valid plea. So, for example, appeals based
on erroneous judicial rulings, and appeals based on incompetent legal
advice, can succeed where the effect of the ruling or advice is to lead
defendants to believe that the facts they claimed occurred constituted
offences when they did not, or to believe that they had no defence to
the charge where one was available.45 But errors that merely’ weaken
defendants’ chances of acquittal are not sufficient. This is because in
the former situation, the guilty pleas cannot be read as admission to
the crimes, whilst in the latter situation they can, and are. Defendants
who plead guilty cannot challenge rulings by trial judges that have
weakened their defences, but must plead not guilty and risk the
higher sentence that will follow if convicted at trial.46 Defendants
who plead guilty can still appeal an irregularity that amounts to an
abuse of the process’.47 This is something that, if discovered prior to
conviction, would have resulted in the proceedings being stayed on
the basis that a fair trial was no longer possible. This is a high
43 R v Caley [2012] EWCA Crim 2821, para 14.
44 Sentencing Council, Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea – first hearing on or
after 1 June 2017, supra note 22, para 1.
45 R v Boal [1992] Q.B. 591. The defendant was wrongly advised to plead guilty for
breach of relevant fire regulations when his day to day running of a shop did make
him liable as manager’ for compliance with these regulations. In the U.S. the ability
to appeal against guilty plea convictions on the basis of erroneous legal advice
extends to a failure to inform the defendant of the consequences that would follow
from conviction, including collateral consequences such as the risk of deportation.
See Padilla v Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
46 R v Eriemo [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 206.
47 R v Asiedu [2015] 2 Cr. App. R. 8.
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standard so, for example, non-disclosures, however relevant to
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty, are unlikely to result in suc-
cessful appeals in the absence of proof that the non-disclosures were
occasioned by dishonesty.48
There is also a greater reluctance to allow appeals on the basis of
new evidence that throws doubt on defendants’ guilt. The Court of
Appeal has stated that this will only exceptionally be allowed in the
case of a guilty plea.49 With convictions following trial, new evidence
needs to be capable of belief, provide a ground of appeal, would have
been admissible at the trial and there are cogent reasons for the
failure to have obtained or adduced it earlier.50 But the approach to
new evidence following guilty pleas is much narrower and in practice
closer to a requirement of exoneration. For example, where someone
else has subsequently been convicted of the same crime, or there is
incontrovertible evidence that another person committed that
crime.51
V PART THREE: JUSTIFYING GUILTY PLEAS
5.1 Justifications Offered for the Introduction and Standardisation
of Discounted Sentences for Guilty Pleas
The current system of guilty pleas is not something which was first
introduced as a reform in pursuit of a particular policy. Rather, it
evolved. In sharp contrast to the current situation judges, for example
in the UK in the early 18th century, discouraged guilty pleas,52 pre-
48 Ibid.
49 R v Lee (1984) 79 Cr. App. R 108. The exceptional’ circumstances of this case
were: that the defendant confessed and pleaded guilty to 17 counts of arson and 26
counts of murder despite a public enquiry finding that one fire in which three persons
were killed had been started accidently; his counsel had expressed disquiet over his
plea at trial due to his mental condition; and the new evidence was a Sunday Times
newspaper enquiry which had found that for most if not all of the fires where deaths
had resulted the applicant had untainted alibis.
50 Criminal Justice Act 1968 s.23(2).
51 For example, R v Foster [1985] Q.B. 115 – appeal was allowed when a different
man was convicted of the same rape; R v Halliday [2005] EWCA Crim 2230 – clear
evidence accepted by the Crown that another man had committed one of the rob-
beries, so confession and plea suspect.
52 See J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 18–20.
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ferring that a trial (often a short affair, lasting at most a few hours)53
take place. A trial enabled both judge and jury to hear defendants’
responses to the evidence against them, and to judge their character,
which was relevant to both the decision on their guilt, and the pun-
ishment that should follow. The willingness to accept guilty pleas
developed in response to the changing nature of trials in the second
part of the 18th century. With the increasing involvement of lawyers,
trial became more formal, complex, and protracted.54 This meant
that guilty pleas had an advantage, in terms of saved costs, time, etc.
that they had formerly lacked. Whilst some scholars attribute the
growth of guilty pleas solely to the desire to avoid the increased costs
of this new more expensive form of trial, others have argued that
changes in the nature of prosecution are a more important factor.55
When the prosecution of crime was left to private parties, and
defendants represented themselves, there was little scope for any
negotiation over the charge. But with the political acceptance that
crime is a government responsibility, and the introduction of state
police authorities who both investigate and prosecute crimes, there
was both the possibility of negotiated charges and sentences, and a
political benefit from achieving them. In the United States, by the
middle of the 19th century, plea bargaining had become an important
tool in the armoury of public prosecutors with responsibility for
tackling crime.56 In the United Kingdom, plea bargaining has until
recently developed on a more informal basis. There has always been a
choice, previously open to the police, now within the control of the
CPS, as to which charge to pursue where overlapping charges are
possible, and to prefer only the lesser charge in response to a guilty
plea (as has commonly occurred with, for example, assault cases).
The judiciary’s first contribution to this evolutionary process was
53 J. Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London 1660–1750: Urban Crime and the
Limits of Terror (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 259–260.
54 By the end of the 18th century the presence of counsel had ushered into
criminal procedure the divisions between examinations-in-chief and cross-examina-
tion and between evidence and argument, nourished the growth of the law of evi-
dence, changed the nature of the judicial involvement in the trial, and supplemented
the haphazard efforts of prisoners to defend themselves with professional advocacy.’
D. Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800–1865
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 3.
55 See S. McConville and C. Mirsky, Jury Trials and Plea Bargaining: A True
History (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) ch.1 and works cited therein. Their book is
based on a longitudinal study of prosecutions in the USA from the 19th century.
56 Ibid.
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their willingness to accept pleas in place of trials, and to treat57 guilty
pleas as an expression of remorse justifying a reduction of sentence.58
But routinely offering sizable sentence discounts for guilty pleas has
served to undermine the original remorse’ rationale. Once there is an
expectation that pleading guilty will normally lead to a sentence
discount, it becomes difficult to distinguish between remorseful guilty
defendants and unremorseful guilty defendants who have learned
that guilty pleas will be treated as a sign of remorse and earn shorter
sentences. More seriously still, significant and routine sentence
reductions for guilty pleas raises the obvious risk that at least some of
those pleading guilty will be unremorseful innocent defendants who
plead guilty solely to reduce the expected sentence. As noted by the
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: … it would be naı¨ve to
suppose that innocent persons never plead guilty because of the
prospect of the sentence discount’.59
More recently, the desire to save costs by encouraging defendants
to plead guilty at the earliest opportunity has led to sentencing
guidelines that officially separate pleading guilty and expressing re-
morse into two independent reasons for reducing defendants’ sen-
tences. This separation prevents judges from refusing to offer the
57 The choice of the word treat’ is not accidental. Alan Manson places guilty
pleas, and assisting the police with their enquiries’, in the category of: Factors which
have an intrinsic systemic relation to the effective operation of a criminal justice
system [which] can be recognized as mitigating in order to encourage pragmatically
their systemic role.’ See his essay The Search for Principles of Mitigation: integrating
cultural demands’ in J. Roberts (ed.), Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 40, at 42.
58 It is not clear when the practice of reducing sentences for guilty pleas began, or
how it was first justified. It is not mentioned in an 1877 monograph on sentencing:
E.W. Cox The Principles of Punishment as Applied in the Administration of the
Criminal Law, by Judges and Magistrates (London: Law Times, 1877). Cox only
refers to mitigation based on the seriousness of the offence, and the character of the
accused. The focus is on distinguishing the habitual from the accidental criminal:
very little mitigation of the legal penalty be allowed to [the former] as a rule.’ (159)
D.A. Thomas’s survey of sentencing cases in the 1960’s shows that, by this time, it
was routine to give sentence reductions for guilty pleas and to justify them by ref-
erence to the remorse that they represented. For example, Credit can be given when
a person does plead guilty to the fact that that person is facing up to realities and
shows some sign of repentance…’ Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of
the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (London: Heinemann, 1970) 53. If accepted as
genuine expressions of remorse, guilty pleas could also be treated as significant
evidence of defendants’ guilt, thereby justifying strict restrictions on the right to
appeal conviction following a guilty plea.
59 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, supra note 6, p. 110.
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standard discount for pleading guilty where they suspect the gen-
uineness of the remorse accompanying the plea (for example, where
defendants have insisted on their innocence up to the moment when
they have been presented with overwhelming evidence of their guilt).
Separating the two reasons for sentence reductions makes the benefits
of pleading guilty more certain, and thus increases the effectiveness of
standard plea discounts as inducements to plead guilty. But it also
serves to undermine further any claim that guilty pleas are remorseful
expressions of the truth of defendants’ guilt. The official separation of
the guilty plea from remorse as a reason for sentence reduction forms
part of a package of reforms (the early plea procedure described
above) justified by reference to the public monies saved through re-
duced trial preparation and investigation, the reduced impact of
crimes upon victims, and the benefits to victims and witnesses who
then do not have to testify.60 All three of these claims are con-
testable.61 However, the more important issue here is whether they
increase the pressure on innocent defendants to plead guilty rather
than to seek an acquittal at trial. In the introduction to the sentencing
guidelines setting out the early guilty plea procedure, it states that:
The purpose of this guideline is to encourage those who are going to
plead guilty to do so as early in the court process as possible. Nothing
in the guideline should be used to put pressure on a defendant to
plead guilty’.62 Whether or not these changes have increased the
numbers pleading guilty is a difficult empirical question. Making the
discount fixed and clear increases its effectiveness as incentive. But
making the maximum sentence discount conditional upon defendants
pleading guilty at an earlier time, when they have less disclosure,
reduces its attractiveness as an incentive. So, one might well expect
fewer defendants to plead guilty where a discount is made conditional
60 Sentencing Council, Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea – first hearing on or
after 1 June 2017, supra note 22, Key Principles’.
61 McConville and Marsh argue that late guilty pleas are more attributable to
failings by the prosecution, such as late assessment of the strength of the prosecution
case resulting in late plea bargaining, rather than any gaming’ of the criminal justice
process that could be remedied by incentives to plead guilty earlier. And whilst trial is
an experience that many victims would rather avoid, this is by no means always the
case. The trial can give the victim an opportunity to tell their story – to be heard,
leading to disappointment when a guilty plea ends this possibility. The claimed
saving in private costs (through witnesses not having to appear) is less contentious,
but it is not a substantial justification by itself. Criminal Judges: Legitimacy, Courts
and State-Induced Guilty Pleas in Britain (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), 98–126.
62 Supra note 22, Key Principles’.
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upon an early plea than would occur in a system that gave the same
discount at a later stage. But one can also argue that many defen-
dants faced with this decision at the first Magistrates’ Court hearing
may be psychologically less well placed to face the risks of a heavier
sentence at trial than they would be later in the process. If this is true,
then making the maximum discount conditional upon a plea at the
early plea procedure will result in more guilty pleas, and the claim
that it has increased the pressure to plead guilty is justified.63
It is not plausible to deny that innocent defendants will never
plead guilty in order to obtain reduced sentences, but in their justi-
fications for changes that increase the various savings that can result
from guilty pleas the judiciary have tended to either minimise or
ignore this risk.64 Defendants are meant to be protected from the
improper’ pressure to plead guilty said to arise when judges indicate
63 The suggestion that this does not create pressure on at least some cross-section
of the defendant population is unconvincing’. E. Johnston and T. Smith, The Early
Guilty Plea Scheme and the Rising Wave of Managerialism’ (2017) 181(13) Criminal
Law & Justice Weekly 210. The Home Office recognised this risk in the White Paper
issued following Lord Justice Auld’s proposals for a graduated system of sentence
discounts adjusted to reward early pleas: We do not take lightly the danger of
putting defendants under pressure to plead guilty’, Justice for All, Cm5563 (2002),
para 4.43, at p.77. In other contexts where people are asked to make an important
decision about a possible lost opportunity in response to the first time that the case
for it is made to them (e.g. the purchase of a financial investment), there is a
widespread acceptance that this is a situation of pressure’, and regulations com-
monly provide for cooling off’ periods.
64 Quantifying the risk that the incentives for pleading guilty will result in the
wrongful conviction of the innocent is difficult, if not impossible. Counting only
those cases where a successful appeal establishes the factual innocence of the accused
is clearly too small a figure given the restrictions placed on appeals against guilty plea
convictions and the Court of Appeal’s normal reluctance to declare that those whose
convictions are unsafe’ are actually innocent. Some attempts have been made in the
United States to generalise from the numbers exonerated on the basis of new evi-
dence (usually forensic). See S. Gross, Convicting the Innocent’ (2008) 4 Annual
Review of Law and Social Science, 173. Gross found that the false conviction rate for
capital murder cases between 1973 and 1989 was 2.3%. He cites a smaller study of
cases where murder was accompanied by rape (and semen available for DNA testing)
which found an error rate of 5%. There are no figures for guilty plea convictions: It
is also a fair guess that some of those innocent defendants do plead guilty. But how
many? Hundreds a year? Thousands a year? Once again, we don’t know.’ (at 180) J.
Baldwin and M. McConville, in their 1970s study, arranged for the court papers of
defendants who had pleaded guilty to be reviewed by a Chief Constable and retired
Justices clerk. In one fifth of cases, they concluded that the defendants should not
have been advised to plead guilty. Negotiated Justice: Pressures on Defendants to
Plead Guilty (London: Martin Robertson, 1977) 75.
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to defendants the different sentences available on pleading guilty and
following trial – a protection that has no obvious rationale.
5.2 Justifications Offered in the Court of Appeal when Determining
Convictions as Safe
Our system, with its reliance on guilty pleas accompanied by sentence
discounts, has been criticised for putting considerations of cost and
effectiveness ahead of the usual characteristics attributed to trial –
accuracy in verdicts, and fairness to defendants. Much of this criti-
cism has been directed to our judiciary, as authors of reports rec-
ommending reforms, members of the Sentencing Council, and as
sitting judges who fail adequately to acknowledge the pressure to
plead guilty arising from sentence discounts.65 But these develop-
ments, in which the judiciary have played a leading role, create
particular difficulties for those judges who sit in the Court of Appeal,
and have to decide which convictions are safe, and which constitute
miscarriages of justice. The actual problem facing these judges is that
they cannot use considerations of costs and effectiveness which have
led us to our current system of summary or negotiated justice, when
articulating reasons why individual convictions should not be qua-
shed. Hence our view that this is an example of what Calabresi and
Bobbitt called tragic choices’.
Let us consider two recent judicial pronouncements on the nature
of guilty pleas. In the Supreme Court in Asiedu in 2016, a terrorist
explosives case, Lord Hughes (formerly Vice President of the Crim-
inal Division of the Court of Appeal) refused to allow an appeal
against a guilty plea conviction where there had been a serious non-
disclosure that might well have resulted in a successful appeal if the
conviction had been the result of a trial, on the basis that:
A defendant who pleads guilty is making a formal admission in open court that
he is guilty of the offence. … once he has admitted such facts by an unam-
biguous and deliberately intended plea of guilty, there cannot then be an ap-
peal against his conviction, for the simple reason that there is nothing unsafe
about a conviction based on the defendant’s own voluntary confession in open
court.66
65 McConville and Marsh, supra note 61, offer sustained criticism of our criminal
judges’.
66 Asiedu, supra note 47, para 19.
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And in R. v Caley in 2012 Lord Justice Hughes (as he then was)
defended the practice of reducing the sentence discount for pleading
guilty, where defendants delay their decision until their lawyers have
full knowledge of the case against them, on the basis that:
… whilst it is perfectly proper for a defendant to require advice from his
lawyers on the strength of the evidence (just as he is perfectly entitled to insist
on putting the Crown to proof at trial), he does not require it in order to know
whether he is guilty or not; he requires it in order to assess the prospects of
conviction or acquittal, which is different.67
In both of these statements Lords Hughes is insisting that guilty pleas
are (at least for the legal processes associated with determining guilt)
factually accurate confessions, by the guilty, of the crimes that they
have committed. As such, rather than being a suspect form of evi-
dence, something that may even support more liberal rights to appeal
than other kinds of process leading to conviction, they are treated as
ultra-safe – justifying pleas, for example, obtained in circumstances
where defendants may have been unaware of evidence that might be
material to their defences.
These statements run contrary to the obvious dangers arising from
offering defendants incentives to plead guilty. The attractiveness of these
incentives relates to factors that have no evidential value in themselves.
Rather they depend on such things as defendants’ attitude to risk, or the
varied impact that a criminal record or a period of imprisonment will
have on them in light of their personal circumstances.68 There is also a
predictable tension between these statements about guilty pleas, and the
manner in which appeal courts approach appeals against conviction
following trial. The qualities of fact finding, which the court habitually
attributes to a full trial before a jury as part of its routinedeference to this
form of trial, are absent from guilty plea convictions. Instead, deference
has to be directed to the guilty plea, in many respects requiring Lord
Hughes (or other appeal court judges) to elevate the evidential status of
the plea to a level that compensates for the absence of any substantive
review of the evidence. It is difficult to accept that pleas offer such in-
controvertible evidence of guilt, even if defendants were not offered
sentence discounts as incentives toplead guilty.The ability of defendants
67 Supra note 43, para 14.
68 For a fuller account of such arguments, see generally R. Nobles and D. Schiff,
Criminal Justice Unhinged: The Challenge of Guilty Pleas’ (2019) 39(1) Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 100, esp 110–12 for some of the contradictory implications
concerning personal circumstances.
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towithdraw confessionsmade prior to trial, and the need for the probity
and reliability of such confessions to be assessed at trials in light of all the
surrounding evidence, acknowledges the fallibility of confession as a
form of evidence. No matter how formal the circumstances of confes-
sions, and how much legal assistance is provided at the time, judges
cannot prevent defendants from giving evidence at trial which contra-
dicts their earlier confessions. Nor could judges direct juries that the
contradictory evidence should be given no weight on the basis that the
earlier confessions constituted incontrovertible evidence of guilt. And it
is worth pointing out the irony of Lord Hughes making such strong
claims about the safety of convictions obtained through guilty pleas
especially in the particular circumstances of Asiedu. The defendant in
that case, at his earlier appeal against sentence, had been described by a
different Court of Appeal as a liar on an epic scale’.69 His guilty plea
resulted in a sentence whichmade him eligible for release on license 23½
years earlier thanhis co-defendants. It is hardnot topresume that there is
little evidential value in a guilty plea entered by an inveterate liar offered
this level of inducement to plead guilty.70
5.3 Non-evidential Bases for Restricting Appeals Against Guilty Pleas
In the Asiedu case Lord Hughes gave additional reasons for finding the
conviction safe that did not depend on the evidential value of the plea:
… a defendant who is confronted by a powerful case may have difficult deci-
sions to make whether to admit the offence or not. He will of course be advised
that if he does plead guilty that fact will be reflected in sentence, but that
general proposition of sentencing law does not alter his freedom of choice in
the absence of an improper direct inducement from the judge …. He will
always have it made clear to him that a plea of guilty, should he choose to
tender it, amounts to a confession.
… the trial process is not a tactical game. A defendant knows the true facts; he
ought not to admit to facts which are not true, whatever the evidence against
him, and this will always be the advice he is given. If he does admit them, the
69 R v Manfo Kwaku Asiedu [2009] 1 Cr App R (S) 72, para 8 (Sentencing Appeal).
70 Asiedu was convicted after pleading guilty in advance of what would have been
his re-trial, the jury at the previous trial having failed to reach agreement on the
charges against him. His co-defendants at the first trial received life sentences with a
minimum of 40 years. Asiedu pleaded guilty in exchange for the charges being
reduced, a maximum guilty plea discount being applied to the sentence applicable to
those charges, and the most favourable version of the facts being used as the basis of
sentencing. He received a fixed sentence of 33 years which, with good behaviour in
prison, would make him eligible for release after 16½ years.
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evidence that they are true then comes from himself, whatever may be the other
evidence advanced by the Crown.71
Here Lord Hughes is making claims about the justice of holding
defendants to their pleas irrespective of the pleas’ evidential value. He
contends that it is fair to hold defendants to the expected consequences
of their choices, without regard to the incentives offered for them to
exercise their choices in a particular manner; and that innocent
defendants who plead guilty are to some extent responsible for their
ownwrongful convictions.As a justification, perhaps this even assumes
that innocent defendants have a moral duty to plead not guilty. Thus,
having committed the wrong’ of pleading guilty when innocent,
defendants cannot be allowed to appeal against their own wrongful
acts. These claims are clearly problematic. Is it appropriate to allow
defendants to choose whether they should be found guilty or not? If the
purpose of criminal procedures is to identify the factually guilty, then it
is unclear why this factual question should be decided through some-
one’s choice, however free. It is one thing to decide what facts one
believes exist by reference to the evidence available, it is quite another to
claim that a state of facts exists because someone, even defendants, have
chosen to confirm their existence.72 Offering someone incentives to
choosewhether a particular state of facts exists is even less appropriate.
The first statement conflates choice with the fairness of choice.
Choices (voluntary selections from alternatives) do not cease to be such
just because one is given strong incentives to prefer one choice over
another. Although one can speak of coercion’, lack of choice’, or
involuntary choices’ when the act of choosing is accompanied by the
threat of something which one has a right to avoid,73 defendants have
71 Supra note 47 paras 31 and 32.
72 The system is meant to ascertain the facts according to the evidence and to
assign the punishment proportionate to the crime for the sake of protecting the
public. [However] These purposes – truth and justice – cannot be served by a bar-
gaining process.’ R. Grant, Strings Attached: Untangling the Ethics of Incentives
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) 101.
73 Such as an improper’ inducement or threat. But this, of course, requires a
judgement as to what is improper. For an extensive analysis of the kinds of improper
action that might render a guilty plea involuntary, see M. Langer, Rethinking Plea
Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American
Criminal Procedure’ (2006) 33 American Journal of Criminal Law 223. Langer’s own
examples are discounts offered when the evidence is highly unlikely to secure a
conviction at trial; when the sentences authorised by the legislature are excessive, or
the charges cover conduct which, though criminal, is socially innocuous. He makes a
good moral case for why these practices make a plea involuntary. Treating these
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no right to avoid trial if there is evidence sufficient to ground a charge (a
case to answer), and no right not to suffer the appropriate sentence if
they are convicted at trial. So, they cannot claim either that the prospect
of trial constitutes coercion, or that the offer of a lesser punishment for
pleading guilty is coercive. But the fact that someone chooses in full
knowledge of what is expected to follow, and without a threat of illegal
or immoral consequence, does not tell one whether it is fair or rea-
sonable for them tohave had tomake that choice, orwhether it is unfair
or unreasonable for them to seek to undo that choice at a later date.74
The second statement comes closest (if accepted) to justifying how
the guilty pleas procedures are actually conducted, with defendants
required to be formally warned that they should not plead guilty if they
are in fact innocent. There are good reasons for such a warning, not
least the harm done if those in fact guilty of crimes remain undetected
because innocent persons falsely admit to crimes that they did not
commit. Butwhateverwrong is committed by innocent defendantswho
falsely plead guilty, it is harsh to claim that this wrong is so great that it
justifies a general refusal to examine the possibility that they may be
innocent. It also seems tobeunfair to place responsibility for thiswrong
solely with the defendant. To use a biblical metaphor, Eve and Adam
ate the apple but the serpent encouraged them, the serpent here being
the sentence discounts offered to all defendants who plead guilty. The
Footnote 73 continued
practices as grounds of appeal is more problematic. It is difficult for the courts to
deny the legislature’s authority to criminalize conduct or determine sentences. The
remaining practice, accepting pleas where the prosecution evidence is weak, could be
reduced if trial judges took a more active role in scrutinising the prosecution evidence
prior to accepting a plea, including not treating a confession as corroborating the
prosecution case. Appeals could then plausibly be made on the basis that the trial
judge failed to recognise the weakness of the prosecution case.
74 Langer, ibid., questions Langbein’s argument that the coercion’ of sentence
discounts for guilty pleas makes them as involuntary as the confessions obtained in
Medieval Europe through the use of judicially supervised torture, on the basis that
extreme pressure to choose in a particular way does not make a choice involuntary
unless the pressure is illegitimate. (J. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining’ (1978)
46 University of Chicago Law Review 3, at 18) Langer’s counter example is a patient
who has to choose between death from a medical condition or buying medical
treatment. The purchase would still be described as voluntary. But what Langer fails
to consider, is that his argument makes the confession after torture in a Medieval
court (in the knowledge that the torture will resume if the confession is withdrawn) as
voluntary as the contemporary guilty plea, provided only we accept that, applying
the standards of the time, the torture, being legal, was legitimate. This points again to
the difficulties of seeking to hold people to their choices solely on the basis that they
are voluntary.
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harshness of relying on the wrong’ of falsely admitting guilt to justify
refusing to respond in nearly all cases to defendants who attempt to
change their pleas at a later date75 and restricting their possibilities of
appeal, is compounded by the loss of discount faced by defendants who
refuse to plea until they have a full sense of the case against them.76And
in a case like Asiedu, where the defendant decided to plead guilty in
ignorance of a significant breach of the prosecution’s disclosure obli-
gations, LordHughes’ approach blames defendants, and in some cases
potentially innocent defendants, for decisions that they might not have
taken but for wrongs committed by others.
Legal academics have offered other justifications for refusing to give
credibility todefendantswhowish to appeal their guilty plea convictions.
As guilty pleas involve explicit or implicit negotiations they have been
likened to the process of settlement within civil proceedings – amutually
beneficial contract which, once agreed, should not be re-opened by
parties who later change their minds.77 This rationale ignores the crucial
difference between civil and criminal proceedings. The community as a
whole normally has no independent interest in establishing whether a
civil defendant did or did not commit the actions complained of. False
convictions, by contrast, impact on the community by removing atten-
tion from those actually responsible for crimes, and wasting resources
punishing and rehabilitating the wrong persons.78 So the state has both
an interest in getting convictions right in the first instance and quashing
themwhere mistakes have beenmade thereafter. Additional weaknesses
in the contractual justification lie with the absence, in the treatment of
guilty pleas, of any of the factors that allow civil parties to re-open
settlement contracts. Misrepresentation, or failure to disclose informa-
tion that the other party hada duty to provide,would be expected, where
75 The restrictive practice is set out in The Criminal Procedure Rules: The Practice
Directions, October 2015 edition, as amended, supra note 26, at 24.10
76 The requirement to enter a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity in order to
obtain the maximum one third discount does not depend on the extent of advance
information, service of evidence, disclosure of unused material, or the grant of legal
aid’. Blackstone’s Criminal Practice: 2016 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) D5.27.
77 See F. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise’ (1992) 101 Yale Law
Journal 1969; Scott and Stunz, supra note 16.
78 The desire of any court must be to ensure, so far as possible, that only those are
punished who are in fact guilty…’ S (an infant) v Recorder of Manchester [1971] A.C.
481 at 501 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Guest.
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serious, to allow the disadvantaged party to avoid the settlement con-
tract.79 Juliet Horne has discussed whether the judicial treatment of
guilty pleas canbe justifiedon thebasis that aguiltyplea is adelegationof
the jury’s function to the defendant.80 Are defendants’ self-assessment,
aided by counsel, of the cases against them whereby they convict
themselves, ones where they regard the prosecution evidence as suffi-
ciently strong that they would expect a jury to convict? Is this akin to the
kinds of self-certification processes that one finds in certain regulatory
regimes? This is an interesting rationale but, as she concedes, it cannot
explain current practice, as a genuine commitment to an accurate self-
assessment would not lead to incentives to form such a judgement at the
earliest opportunity. Nor would it justify an inability to alter such self-
assessments where evidence had been wrongfully admitted or excluded,
or not disclosed.
The weakness of the justifications given for restricting appeals
against guilty pleas points to the fact that these normative rationales are
not the operative reasons for such restrictive practices. Further evi-
dence of this is provided by developments within both the US and the
UKwhere the use of the plea has developed in amannerwhich excludes
the possibility of some of these rationales, without any lessoning of
appeal courts’ resistance to appeals against guilty plea convictions. In
theUSwith the development of theAlford plea,81 we have a situation in
which defendants can plead guilty and earn their sentence discounts,
whilst still asserting their innocence. This removes any possibility of
treating guilty plea convictions as evidence of guilt, or expressions of
remorse, or factual evidence that has misled the court. The court is left
solelywith the status of such pleas aswaivers of rights of appeal – an act
that defendants have chosen voluntarily to make in the knowledge of
the consequences, and this has to stand alone as a justification for the
79 The gradual loss of discount does not contradict the comparison with civil
proceedings. It is open to civil law defendants to structure their offers as progres-
sively smaller sums the further the case proceeds: £100,00 if you settle pre-discovery,
£50,000 if we have to go through discovery’, etc.
80 See Horne, supra note 20.
81 North Carolina v Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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refusal to allow appeals against conviction.82 In theUK, the equivalent
of Alford pleas occur when defendants plead guilty whilst still insisting
to their counsel that they are innocent. In R v Dann83 the defendant
accompanied his plea with a signed statement declaring that he was not
guilty and was only pleading guilty in response to an offer not to
prosecute his wife if he did. On appeal, the statement was held to make
no difference to the unequivocal’ nature of his plea, and the restrictions
on appeal which followed, although there was no claim in this case that
the plea itself was evidence of the defendant’s guilt.84 Thus the differ-
ence here between the US and the UK is more a matter of form than
substance – in the US the trial court is made aware of the claim of
innocence at the time of the guilty plea, whilst in theUK this knowledge
remains with defendants’ counsel.
5.4 Ongoing Reasons for the Resistance to Guilty Plea Appeals – Back
to Workable Relationships?
It is difficult to quantify the increased workload that could arise if the
Court of Appeal adopted a more liberal attitude towards appeals
against convictions based on guilty pleas. However, we can consider
some figures that give a sense of the size of the problem. For example,
the Court of Appeal heard 215 conviction appeals in 2016–17.85
Given the restricted grounds for appealing guilty pleas, we can as-
sume that few if any of these appeals followed guilty pleas. In 2016–
17 the CPS obtained convictions through trial in 7,806 cases, some
8.80% of convictions (61,808 guilty pleas were 70.10% of overall
convictions).86 As 215 cases were appealed, there was an appeal rate
in relation to convictions after trial (relying on our assumption that
82 See, S. Schneider,’ When Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess: Analyzing the
Ramifications of Entering Alford Pleas in the Context of the Burgeoning Innocence
Movement’ (2013) 103 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 279. The introduction
of such pleas in the UK might lead to more guilty pleas – as defendants may feel that
they will suffer less reputational damage from conviction if they can maintain the
claim of innocence.
83 [2015] EWCA Crim 390.
84 See also R v Herbert (1992) 94 Cr. App. R. 230 where, in similar circumstances
to Dann, a defendant pleaded guilty whilst maintaining his innocence’.
85 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Annual Report 2016–17, Annex C.https://
www.judiciary.uk/publications/court-of-appeal-criminal-division-annual-report-
2016-17/.
86 CPS crown court outcomes 2014–17. https://www.CPS.gov.uk/underlying-data/
CPS-crown-court-outcomes-2014-2017.
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there were very few guilty plea appeals) of 2.75%. Although of course
one would expect it to be considerably less, if the same appeal rate
occurred with their guilty plea convictions the Court of Appeal would
have to hear nearly an extra 1,700 cases. This would represent
approaching an eight-fold increase in the Court’s workload. In
addition, there would be an increase in the workload of the Crown
Courts, who would have to conduct trials originally avoided through
the plea. If the current statutory bar against appeals from Magis-
trates’ Courts guilty plea convictions were removed, there is a similar
potential for a huge increase in the appeal workload of the Crown
Court. In 2018 there were 4,737 appeals against conviction heard in
the Crown Courts.87 We assume that few of these would have in-
volved guilty pleas.88 To get a rough sense of the appeal rate appli-
cable, we can look again at the 2016–17 CPS figures, this time for
convictions in the Magistrates’ Courts following trial: 28,424.89 If
4,737 is treated as the number of appeals from CPS convictions at
trial in 2016–17 it would represent an appeal rate of 16.67%. There
were 390,344 convictions following guilty pleas in the Magistrates’
Court in 2016. If 16.7% of these were appealed this would generate
over 65,080 appeals! This is, of course, quite unrealistic in many
respects. Nevertheless, these figures illustrate what we already know –
the dependence of our criminal justice system on guilty pleas at trial
level creates a situation in which granting any increased rights of
appeal to those who have pleaded guilty could be extremely costly.90
The difficulties of allowing appeals against guilty plea convictions
is not simply a matter of numbers. The immediate problem in almost
every case is the lack of a transcript of evidence.91 With appeals
against convictions following trial, the Court of Appeal, or other
appeal body, assesses the significance of any procedural error, or new
87 As set out in the tables at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/790161/ccsq-tables-q4-2018.ods.
88 Magistrates Courts Act 1980, s.108.
89 As set out in their 2018–19 report, at p. 22: https://www.CPS.gov.uk/sites/
default/files/documents/publications/CPS-Annual-Report-and-Accounts-2018-19.
pdf.
90 The higher rate of appeal against conviction at trial by Magistrates’ compared
with Crown Courts reflects the unrestricted (except by time limits) right to a com-
plete re-hearing. Would it continue to be unrestricted, and how would this operate, if
guilty plea convictions could also be appealed?
91 However, in cases where the guilty plea was entered at a re-trial, there will be a
transcript of the first trial.
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evidence, in light of the whole of the evidence. Where evidence is
disputed, they assume that the jury accepted the prosecution’s version
of events and are reluctant to form a different view (hence the
accusation of undue deference to juries). This method is not open to
them with guilty pleas. The Court cannot rely on a prior assessment
of the evidence. It must form its own view of the prior evidence and,
in most cases, this will only be the evidence disclosed to the defence
up to the moment when the guilty plea was entered. This also goes
some way to explain the appeal court’s reluctance to consider new
evidence. Being unable to assess the new evidence in light of the
evidence presented at trial, it has little against which to balance that
evidence when considering the safety of the conviction. Evidence
which, by itself, shows that the defendant could not have committed
the crime does not require any weighing. But, as the extensive case
law on the right to compensation following successful appeals against
conviction has consistently recognised, one rarely encounters new
evidence that establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that a
defendant could not have committed the offence in question.92
As well as the difficulties of hearing guilty plea appeals, there are
also difficulties with any possible remedy. If the Court of Appeal
decides that a guilty plea conviction is unsafe it must either quash the
conviction per se or quash the conviction and order a trial/re-trial.
The latter outcome raises all the issues which currently bedevil the
Court when considering whether to order re-trials. The longer the
delay between a conviction and the order for retrial, the less likely it is
that the trial will be either fair or effective. Witnesses forget, move
and die. Where this undermines the prosecution case one has the
prospect of defendants being acquitted due to lack of formerly
available evidence. Where the deterioration affects defendants’ cases,
we have the prospect of re-trials’ that will appear unfair in light of
evidence, or potentially exclusionary evidence, no longer available.
The absence of a trial transcript also reduces the Court’s ability to
impose alternative convictions rather than sustain convictions. This
power arises following successful appeals from convictions following
either trial or a guilty plea.93 But in the case of early guilty plea
convictions there will have been no articulation or exploration of the
92 R (on the application of Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] UKSC 18;
Allen v United Kingdom (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 10; R (on the application of Hallam) v
Secretary of State for Justice [2019] UKSC 2.
93 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s3,3A (as substituted by the Criminal Justice Act
2003 ss.316(3), 336(3)(4).
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defence case, making it difficult to justify alternative offences, par-
ticularly as the court is unable to rely on the plea as evidence of guilt.
The resources and law and order implications of increasing the
right to appeal guilty plea convictions rarely, if ever, feature in Court
of Appeal judgments. Instead we find statements like those of Lord
Hughes which, as we have tried to illustrate, are not dissimilar from
the statements of other senior judicial figures over one hundred years
earlier in their adamant opposition to the setting up of a Court of
Criminal Appeal. Hence our view that these statements are an
example of tragic choices – the use of value reasoning to defend
institutional arrangements put in place for other reasons, particularly
those of cost and efficiency. However, one should not interpret the
absence of an express discussion of these factors and the attempt to
justify guilty plea convictions on the basis of ideas of truth and moral
wrongdoing as no more than a judicial smokescreen. There are other
reasons why these considerations of cost and efficiency would not
feature in the discourse of any Court of Appeal. The Court’s role is to
distinguish safe from unsafe convictions. It is not open to the Court
to identify the number of appeals that it believes the Court could
manage, and pronounce the applications made next in time as
automatically safe’. In this the Court of Appeal is no different from
any other court. It has to treat like cases alike. As such, the discourse
through which it rations access to itself and the courts which it
supervises has to be based on distinctions which it can draw, and
justify, between convictions which it finds safe, and those it finds
unsafe. In constructing its reasons for finding guilty plea convictions
safe, it has to draw upon the same discourse of truth, and rights, with
which it constructs safe and unsafe convictions on appeals from tri-
als. Whether judges convince themselves of the justice of their current
treatment of guilty pleas is an open question. But from an external
perspective, the attempt to justify a near blanket ban on guilty plea
convictions has echoes of the 19th century judicial resistance to any
appeals against jury verdicts except on points of law, as expressed by
Baron Parke in the quote at the start of this article – a view which, if
our system ever evolves in a manner that dispenses with guilty pleas,
may be viewed as sanguine, if not smug complacency.
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VI PART FOUR: MOVING ON FROM THE CURRENT
POSITION?
There is little evidence that our recent dependence on guilty pleas is
going to lessen in the near future. A proposal to increase sentence
discounts for guilty pleas (from one third to one half) was made as
recently as 2010.94 This proposal was not shelved because of its effect
on the potential safety of convictions, but principally because the
government felt that it might result in sentences, particularly for sex
crimes, that the public would regard as too lenient.95 The CPS are
committed to maintaining or increasing the percentage of convictions
obtained through guilty pleas at the first crown court hearing, as
evidenced by their selection of this as a performance indicator.96 The
Ministry of Justice declines to set a target for guilty pleas, as this
could discourage prosecution of hard-to-prosecute cases or encour-
age unreasonable pressure on defendants to plead guilty early’.97 But
at the same time, it treats avoiding cracked trials as one of the pri-
mary measures of its own efficiency. As four out of five cracked trials
are the result of defendants entering late changes of plea, encouraging
more defendants to enter early guilty pleas will demonstrate the
Ministry’s increased efficiency.98
Meanwhile, those who draw attention to the potential for real
injustices associated with guilty plea convictions have great difficulty
in advocating their diminishing, in light of the cost of offering trials to
many of those persons currently pleading guilty. Campbell, Ashworth
and Redmayne, who criticise guilty pleas for their failure to provide
94 Ministry of Justice (Cm 7972), Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment,
Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders.
95 J. Roberts and B. Bradford, Sentence Reductions for a Guilty Plea in England
and Wales: Exploring New Empirical Trends’ (2015) 12 Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies 187, at 189.
96 CPS Annual report 2018–9, supra note 15, p. 11.
97 National Audit Office (NAO), Ministry of Justice: Efficiency in the Criminal
Justice System, HC 852 Session 2015–16 1 March 2016, Part 1, p. 17.
98 The NAO, ibid., noted that between 2011 and 2015 there were fewer cracked
trials (down from 30% to 24%) and more trials being vacated (up from 24% to
33%). They concluded that this suggests that the system is getting better at identi-
fying where cases are likely to crack and removing them from the list before trial.’
ibid., p. 17. It is unclear how or why court staff would become better at identifying
which cases listed for trial would end in guilty pleas. The more likely explanation for
these figures is that fewer defendants left it until their trials to change their plea to
guilty.
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the same assurances of accuracy and fairness as come with trial,
question whether we could afford even to review prosecution evidence
in guilty plea cases without some compensating reduction in the re-
sources needed to try those who plead not guilty. Their argument is
principally directed to the level of discounts that should be available,
proposing a limit of 10% on the sentence reduction offered for
pleading guilty.99 McConville and Marsh question the effectiveness of
sentence discounts, relying on a Canadian study which concluded
that 70% of those who plead guilty might still be expected to do so
without any reduction in sentence.100 They similarly question the
need for sentence discounts to reduce progressively in order to save
the costs of cracked’ trials.101 Reducing the levels of sentence dis-
count reduces the incentives for defendants to plead guilty, and in-
creases the plausibility of judicial claims that guilty pleas offer a safe
basis for convictions. However, unless the reduction in the size of
discounts was accompanied by a reduction in the sentences normally
imposed after conviction at trial, it would result in a significant in-
crease in the prison population.102 In addition, any claim that a fixed
percentage reduction in the automatic discount for pleading guilty
would make such convictions safe needs to take account of the fac-
tors that will alter the impact of that reduction: the ability to choose
lesser charges, and the ability to agree facts which minimise the
severity of the offence, and the choice of whether to charge persons
close to the defendant.
Should we seek to protect those persons who might be more
vulnerable to the pressure to plead guilty when innocent?103 This
99 L. Campbell, A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), ch. 10, especially Conclusion’ at 10.8 and p. 341.
100 McConville and Marsh, supra note 61, p.112.
101 Though they rely on the Runciman Royal Commission’s estimate of the per-
centage of cracked’ trails caused by late changes of plea, which conflicts with the
much higher NAO more current estimate.
102 The Justice Select Committee, in their Report on the proposed reduction in
sentence discounts for failure to plead at the earliest opportunity, estimated that this
change might increase the prison population by between 1,000 and 4,000. See Justice
Select Committee Report, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea Guideline. para
11, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/
cmjust/168/16802.htm.
103 See, for example, J. Peay and E. Player, Pleading Guilty: Why Vulnerability
Matters’ (2018) 81 Modern Law Review 929; R. Helm, Conviction by Consent?
Vulnerability, Autonomy and Conviction by Guilty Plea’, (2019) 83 The Journal of
Criminal Law 161.
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raises problems of identifying vulnerability. Vulnerability may arise
from the general capacity of the individual (as with mental illness), or
their personal circumstances, as with those who cannot afford the
financial costs of their defence, or have employment, business or
family responsibilities that make it imperative for them to avoid or
reduce their period of custody. It may also arise from the particular
circumstances of the offence, as occurs when the defendant lies on the
cusp of a prison sentence and therefore may be able to avoid custody
through pleading guilty.104 Or it may arise through a combination of
factors. Alongside the issues of identifying who is to be considered
vulnerable, one has to consider at what point in the process this
element of vulnerability should be identified, and what protection
should be afforded? Since the plea crucially affects the procedures
that follow, this assessment needs to be made prior to the decision to
plead. If the guilty pleas of the unidentified vulnerable are void or
voidable, one faces the prospect of having later to restart procedures
and processes of preparing for trial which, with sufficient delay, may
no longer be possible.
If procedures could be put in place which identified the vulnerable,
what response is appropriate? Simply to exclude them from the ability
to plead guilty and require them to face a trial would, without further
adjustment, result in those who were convicted at trial spending
longer in prison than more able’ defendants who had been allowed to
plead guilty and receive their discounted sentences. So, if vulnera-
bility were identified by reference to factors such as disability, socio-
economic status, or ethnic group, the advantages of greater certainty
that their convictions were justified by the evidence would have to be
weighed against the increase in penalties that this group would on
average face compared with other persons who are convicted of the
same crimes, but have been able to plead guilty and achieve reduc-
tions in their sentences.105 One could avoid this consequence by
allowing the vulnerable who opt for trial to obtain the same discounts
as the able who plead guilty. This would be controversial, as the
104 For an argument against using guilty plea reductions in situations where one
escapes custody by plea – where the pressure to plead guilty is acute – see J. Robert
and L. Harris, Reconceptualising the Custody Threshold in England and Wales’
(2017) 28 Criminal Law Forum 477.
105 Roger Hood found that suspects from an Afro-Caribbean background tend to
plead not guilty more frequently than others and, when convicted, tend to receive
longer sentences largely because they have forfeited the discount for pleading guilty:
Race and Sentencing: a Study in the Crown Court (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)
125.
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justifications given for discounts (costs saved, witnesses and victims
spared from having to testify, etc.) would be absent in such cases. The
current adjustment for the vulnerable is restricted to circumstances
where it is unreasonable for them to enter a guilty plea at the earliest
opportunity, in which case they may still receive the full discount for
a late plea. The focus of this exception (and the only specific example
provided in the guidelines) is a person who fails to understand that
the acts they are accused of committing constitute a criminal of-
fence.106 The guidelines expressly distinguish between failing to
understand that an offence has been committed (where delay in
entering a plea will be excused) and failing to understand the strength
of the prosecution case (where it will not).107 This exception does not
seek to protect those who, for reasons of mental capacity or external
pressures, might be particularly inclined to plead guilty despite
innocence in order to reduce the severity of their sentence.
In a discussion of the possibilities for change, one needs also to
take account of the presence or absence of pressure for reform from
outside the legal system, most notably from the mass media and the
political system. Public confidence in the criminal justice system is a
recognised pre-condition to its efficient operation, and miscarriages
of justice have been credited, within both the media and Parliament,
as something that can undermine that confidence. The media reports
on miscarriages in terms of the factual innocence of those convicted,
whereas, as recently emphasised by Baroness Hale: ‘‘Innocence as
such is not a concept known to our criminal justice system’’.108
Miscarriages are constructed within our legal system in terms of er-
rors of procedure or new evidence which, had the former not oc-
curred or the latter been available, might have made a difference to
the verdict (guilty or not guilty) in a criminal trial. By contrast, the
media focus on a person’s factual innocence, and in consequence one
106 Where the sentencing court is satisfied that there were particular circumstances
which significantly reduced the defendant’s ability to understand what was alleged or
otherwise made it unreasonable to expect the defendant to indicate a guilty plea
sooner than was done, a reduction of one-third should still be made’. Sentencing
Council, supra note 22, Principle F1.
107 In considering whether this exception applies, sentencers should distinguish
between cases in which it is necessary to receive advice and/or have sight of evidence
in order to understand whether the defendant is in fact and law guilty of the of-
fence(s) charged, and cases in which a defendant merely delays guilty plea(s) in order
to assess the strength of the prosecution evidence and the prospects of conviction or
acquittal.’ ibid.
108 Adams, supra note 92, para 116.
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might have expected this media focus to provide a basis for critical
reporting of guilty plea convictions.109 After all, it is not difficult to
understand that significant sentence reductions offered in exchange
for guilty pleas represent a pressure to plead guilty that can be ex-
pected to influence at least some innocent defendants to plead guilty.
But there appears to be no general dissatisfaction within the media
over convictions obtained through guilty pleas. Indeed, one of the
factors normally required before the media give credence to claims of
wrongful (factually innocent) conviction is that the person involved
continues to proclaim their innocence. Whilst confessions obtained in
custody and subsequently retracted are no longer given the status that
they formerly had, pleading guilty provides a formidable obstacle to
mounting a press story (let alone a media campaign) that a factually
innocent person has been wrongfully convicted.
Another factor that inhibits media pressure for change in the
treatment of guilty pleas is the role played by the CCRC.110 Prior to
1997 there was no procedure which could quash a conviction ob-
tained through a guilty plea in the Magistrates’ Court. Where evi-
dence emerged that exonerated the defendant the only procedure
open to them was to seek a pardon. Since the CCRC began operating
in that year there is now a process by which any Magistrates’ Court
conviction which the media regard as unsafe (which for the media
invariably translates as a factually innocent defendant) could be re-
109 For extended analysis of the difference between media reporting of convictions
and their status within legal discourse, see R. Nobles and D. Schiff, supra note 2, ch
4.
110 Themedia have become uninterested in publishing reports about miscarriages of
justice, primarily because they appreciate that their reports would be followed not by
administrative action but, seemingly, by inertia. Cases now spend years hidden from
public scrutiny while they are examined by the CCRC’. Bob Woffinden’s written evi-
dence to theHouse of Commons Justice Select Committee in 2014, para 33. http://data.
parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Justice/
CriminalC%CC%88asesR%CC%88eviewC%CC%88ommission/written/16131.html
Bob Woffinden was, until his untimely death in 2018, an investigative journalist who
wrote a large number of books on notorious miscarriages of justice, their notoriety in
many ways due to his extraordinary journalistic endeavours. ‘‘A result of [the advent of
the CCRC] was to keep things out of the media … somewhere along the line a lot of
journalists have got themessage that these things arebeing dealtwith.’’’ (Interviewwith a
journalist, D. Eady, Miscarriages of Justice: The Uncertainty Principle, PhD Thesis,
Cardiff University, July 2009, p. 275. https://orca.cf.ac.uk/54837/1/U585226.pdf.
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viewed by the Crown Court, following application to the CCRC and
referral.111 With Crown Court convictions, the Court of Appeal’s
resistance to reconsidering guilty plea convictions is compensated for,
to a limited extent, by the CCRC’s right to refer guilty plea cases.
However, in view of their statutory authority, the CCRC can only
refer cases where there is a real possibility’ of success, which requires
it to take account of the restrictions which the Court of Appeal has
placed upon guilty plea conviction appeals. This severely limits its
ability to operate as a means to rectify potential wrongful (both in
terms of factual innocence and breaches of rights) convictions arising
from guilty pleas. Nevertheless, the CCRC offers a mechanism
whereby cases which may have gained media attention can be re-
examined by the Court of Appeal, even in guilty plea cases. Such
referrals may deflect media criticism of potentially unremedied mis-
carriages and the demands for reform which might accompany these,
and they do not require referral of a large number of cases to achieve
this. Only a small percentage of those who had pleaded guilty apply
to the CCRC to have their convictions reviewed. In her study of
guilty plea applications to the CCRC over a twelve-month period
Juliet Horne identified 235 such cases.112 This is a significant per-
111 Kerrigan has argued that the CCRC’s power to refer appeals to the Crown
Court under the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 s.11 must apply a real possibility’ test
that anticipates the result of a complete re-hearing under the Magistrates Court 1980
s.108. This means that the CCRC should be able to refer any case where the pros-
ecution will not be able to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant is guilty, provided only that the defendant raises an argument or evidence
not previously raised. As there will have been no trial, this would make summary
guilty plea convictions open to referral whenever the limited record of prosecution
evidence showed something less than overwhelming evidence of guilt. (K. Kerrigan,
Miscarriage of justice in the magistrates’ court: the forgotten power of the Criminal
Cases Review Commission’ [2006] Criminal Law Review 124).
112 In her study of the CCRC, Juliet Horne sampled cases received by the CCRC
in 3 four-month periods between September 1, 2011 and April 30, 2013. She iden-
tified 281 applications for review of convictions following guilty pleas (see Horne,
supra note 20, pp. 251–2, footnotes 749 and 750) – although amending the figures to
represent a fair assessment, it was clear that guilty plea applications were more than
20% of applications. That said it needs to be remembered that conviction following
plea is so much more common than following trial. Her findings are supported in the
latest extended research into the work of the CCRC by C. Hoyle and M. Sato,
Reasons to Doubt: Wrongful Convictions and the Criminal Cases Review Commission
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). They show how one set of guilty plea
convictions have now been overturned in one specific field – that of immigration and
asylum law. But in other guilty plea applications the CCRC’s approach to guilty
pleas is clearly influenced by the Court’ and that (for some Commissioners at least) a
RICHARD NOBLES AND DAVID SCHIFF
centage of the applications to the CCRC (21%), but a very small
number relative to the number of annual guilty plea convictions. Only
a tiny number of these applications resulted in a referral to the Court
of Appeal for a review of conviction. For the first sixteen years of
their existence only 49 guilty plea convictions were referred by the
CCRC for a review of their safety.113 This is a manageable number of
extra appeals. In effect, the CCRC operates as a gatekeeper, identi-
fying exceptional cases where the available evidence provides a
powerful indication of innocence despite the guilty plea. Whilst the
CCRC have never limited themselves to cases which find support in
the mass media, the Commission plays an important role in offering a
means by which such cases can be investigated by a body which is
regarded as impartial. As with miscarriages arising from trial, these
investigations reduce the likelihood that individual cases will be re-
ported in the press in terms of systemic failings and, as such, depress
the pressure for reform.
VII SUMMARY
We have attempted to show that the judicial treatment of appeals
against conviction following a guilty plea is an example of tragic
choice – the need to justify procedures by reference to values such as
rights and truth, and without reference to the considerations (cost,
efficiency, crime control etc.) which have led to their introduction.
Tragic choice is present when judges seek to justify convictions fol-
lowing trial, but this is heightened in guilty plea cases. This is not just
a result of the far larger number of convictions that arise from pleas
rather than trials. When it comes to guilty pleas, the court has to
Footnote 112 continued
guilty plea is synonymous with a confession of guilt, rather than a tactical approach
to securing a reduced sentence or product of poor legal advice’ (at pp. 106 and 107).
Following Horne’s research evidence, they recognise how guilty plea cases tend to be
screened out through ‘‘a highly abbreviated process’’, thus risking ‘‘overlooking
meritorious cases’’.’ (p. 108) The problem remains as to how, and when, other sets of
guilty plea convictions demonstrating a pattern of fallibility will come to the CCRC
and/or Court’s attention and cause them to re-examine their general approach.
113 The success rate in these appeals following referral is however higher than in
other cases, with 39 of these 49 referrals resulting in the conviction being quashed.
(Horne, ibid., p. 252). Again, the detailed evidence suggests particular reasons for
this that do not detract from the CCRC or Court’s general approach to guilty plea
applications and appeals – in other words, specific issues were involved that are not
generalisable – see Hoyle and Sato, ibid., pp. 107–8.
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attribute the same values (truth and rights) to the conviction that
follows a plea as it attributes to a conviction following trial, but
without the benefit of the features of trial which help to make that
attribution plausible (lay judgement, hearing witnesses, cross-exami-
nation, etc.) Recent changes to the plea system (in the interests of
efficiency) such as restricting maximum sentence discounts to pleas
made at the earliest opportunity, further distance guilty pleas from
the protections afforded by trial, and compound the difficulties in
justifying these convictions as safe’.
Guilty pleas also offer the judges little scope for identifying or
remedying errors, as there is no transcript of evidence to review, or a
basis to substitute alternate convictions. A general willingness to al-
low appeals against guilty plea convictions could not only lead to a
large increase in the number of trials but, without a strict time limit
on the right to appeal, would lead to trials which repeat all the dif-
ficulties of ordering fair re-trials long after the original investigation.
In the face of these difficulties, the courts have placed the strictest of
limitations on appeals, basically restricting them to circumstances
where appellants are able to show that they did not intend to admit to
facts that constituted the offense for which they were convicted. Even
circumstances that would ordinarily justify an appeal against a trial
conviction, such as significant non-disclosure or plausible and pro-
bative new evidence can only exceptionally justify a successful appeal
against a guilty plea conviction. Thus, we have a situation in which a
procedure which, on its face is less capable of identifying guilt than a
trial, has to be defended on the basis that it is overwhelmingly more
capable of identifying guilt (or so fair as to justify disregarding the
possibility of innocence). The criminal justice system for England and
Wales has, since 1907, had an institutional means to recognise the
undeniable possibility that trials can in a small (relative to its critic’s
beliefs) but significant number of cases perpetrate miscarriages of
justice. But with guilty pleas we have, for reasons of cost and effi-
ciency, reached a situation where the Court of Appeal cannot provide
a remedy for miscarriages, and must instead, like the judges of the
19th century, claim the relevant procedures are so safe that there is
little or no need for review, even in cases of procedural irregularity
(short of abuse of process) or new evidence (short of exoneration). At
present, there is no reason to think that this situation will be ame-
liorated,
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VIII CONCLUSION
Different pre-trial and trial procedures as they have evolved, whether
through slow evolution or more abrupt legislative change, can be
shown to throw up different potential for miscarriages of justice114
and, at the same time, different challenges for appeal practices, pro-
cedures and doctrine. The appeals process is the place within the
criminal justice system where claims that our procedures for
obtaining convictions are based on acceptable values (truth, rights,
fairness, etc.) are most in evidence and, at the same time, most ex-
posed. As the practices of the criminal justice system evolve, the
procedures which have to be justified when defendants appeal alter.
While tragic choice is, we would argue, a constant feature underlying
the justifications offered in criminal appeals, what has to be justified
by the appeal courts is not constant. There are obvious parallels
between the reliance on conviction through incentivised guilty pleas,
and reliance on convictions obtained through coerced’ confession
evidence.115 The latter has undergone a process of change, with the
opportunities for such coerced confessions reduced through the re-
forms introduced by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
the need to rely on them diminished through the increased availability
of new forms of forensic evidence (DNA, CCTV, etc). These changes
alter what is normal’ at trial, and what needs to be justified on
appeal. That said, our current reliance on guilty pleas is such that it is
difficult to see what changes are going to relieve the judiciary from
having to make the strong claims for their evidential value and
fairness which they are currently making. In so doing, and thereby
refusing to re-examine guilty plea convictions in many, if not most,
circumstances, they expose themselves to accusations that they have
been, and continue to be, indifferent to justice, or at least sanguine
about the improbability of its miscarriage.
114 See R. Nobles and D. Schiff, Trials and Miscarriages: An Evolutionary Socio-
Historical Analysis’ (2018) 29 Criminal Law Forum 167.
115 We use the phrase coerced’ confession evidence as shorthand for the range of
pre-trial practices that no longer live up to our standards, whether concerning
oppressive or even brutal police questioning at one end of the spectrum, to tech-
niques involving suggestibility on the other.
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